PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

As

MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE

REPORTS.
ALIENS.

The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas decides in Petersen
v. State, 89 S. W. 8i, that the right to make laws admitting
aliens to citizenship being vested in Congress,
Citizenship
Objection by

State

and the State courts in enforcing such laws

being mere Federal agents, the State is not

entitled to intervene, after the admission of an alien to
citizenship, and to procure a vacation of the judgment,
because procured by fraud and perjury. See in connection
herewith In re McCarran, 29 N. Y. Supp. 582, 23 L. R.
A. 835.
BAGGAGE.

The Supreme Court of Michigan holds in Withey v.
Pere Marquette R. Co., io4 N. W. 773, that a father,
What
paying full fare for himself, travelling with an
Constitutes

infant child of such tender years that by

custom no fare is demanded for its carriage, may recover
upon the contract of carriage for loss or injury of articles
boughti and used for the child which articles are a part of
the father's baggage. See in connection herewith Prentice v. Decker, 49 Barb. 21.

BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS.

The Court of Chancery of New Jersey decides in Harrison et al. v. Fleischman et al., 61 Atl. 1025, that where a
Trust
building association was charged with notice
Funds
that money paid for certain of its stock was
trust funds of the estate of a decedent, such association was
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constructively guilty of a breach of trust in appropriating
the money to its own use, entitling the estate to share in
the association's assets as a creditor, and not as a stockholder. But where the money so paid could not be traced
or identified, and it did not appear that it was still in the
hands of the building association when it was adjudged
insolvent, the estate was not a preferred creditor. See also
Hunt v. Smith, 58 N. J. Eq. 35CARRIERS.

In Koch v. New York City Ry. Co., 95 N. Y. Supp. 559,
the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Term, decides
that a street railway company may, pursuant
Transfer
Tickets
to its rules, refuse a transfer ticket mutilated
after coming into the possession of the passenger receiving
it, but cannot refuse a ticket mutilated before given him.
It is decided by the New York Supreme Court, Appellate term, in Cohn v. Platt, 95 N. Y. Supp. 535, that a
carrier is not negligent in receiving for shipReceiving
ment overpacked crates of fowls, the shipper,
Overpacked
but not the carrier's servants, being expected to
Crates
be expert on the question of how many fowl could be safely
Compare Lainbert v. Benner, 31 N. Y.
packed in a crate.
Supp. 665.
The Supreme Court of Illinois decides in Illinois
Cent. R. Co. v. Jennings, 75 N. E. 457, that where 'a conAuthority of tract for the shipment of stock entitled the
Conductor
shipper to free transportation in the caboose,
the conductor of the train had no implied authority irrespective of circumstances to invite the shipper to ride on
the engine. Whether he did have such authority in consequence of the surrounding circumstances, it is decided, is
a question for the jury. See in connection herewith Lake
Shore and Michigan Southern Railroad v. Brown, 123 Ill.
162.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

The Supreme Court of California holds in Ex: parte
Hayden, 82 Pac. 315, that a statute, providing that all
PolicePowers fruits, green and dried, contained in packages
to be shipped or offered for shipment, shall
have stamped on the outside of every such package, in
legible letters of certain dimensions, a statement truly and
correctly designating the county and immediate locality in
which such fruit was grown, and providing a penalty of
fine and imprisonment for violation, was not a proper exercise of the state's police power, but was invalid as an unlawful invasion of personal liberty. Compare Los Angeles v.
Spencer, 126 Cal. 673.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma decides in Williams v.
Fourth Nat. Bank of Wichita, Kans., 82 Pac. 496, that
the state statute regulating the sale of stocks of
Sale of Goods
In Bulk

merchandise in bulk, is not unconstitutional.

With this case should be compared
the decision
of the Court of Appeals of New York in Wright v. Hart,
75 N. E. 4o4, where a law of New York passed in 19o2

relating to the same subject is held unconstitutional. The
two decisions should be studied together and the terms of
the two acts compared. In the New York decision the subject
is very thoroughly canvassed and three judges dissent
from the judgment of the court.
The Supreme Court of Indiana holds in City of Elkhart
v. Murray, 75 N. E. 593, that a city ordinance, providing
Class
that it shall be unlawful on and after a certain
Legislation

date to run any street car within the city without

having securely fastened to its front end a proper automatic fender made by a particular fender company, or
some other fender equally as good, to be approved by the
common council or its street committee, was void for nonuniformity and as arbitrarily discriminating in favor of
some manufacturers of fenders and against others. Compare Bessonies v. City of Indianapolis,71 Ind. 189.
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The New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division,
First Department), decides in McMillan v. Klaw & ErlanDue Process
of Law

ger Const. Co., 95 N. Y. Supp., 365, that a

municipal ordinance authorizing, on the payment of a specified fee, the issuance of permits for the construction of ornamental projections beyond the building
line not more than five feet, is in conflict with the constitutional provision that no person shall be deprived of his
property without due process of law, because it permits a
property owner to erect for his own benefit a structure in
the public streets thereby interfering with the easements of
adjoining property owners abutting on the street, consisting
of the right of free access to and egress from their property,
and of the rights to the free circulation of light and air
over the open street to and from their property, which
rights were acquired and paid for on the opening of the
street. Compare Talbot v. New York &c. Ry. Co., 151
N. Y. i6o.

In The Bergner & Engel Brewing Company v. Koenig,
31 Pa. C. C. R. 455, the Court of Common Pleas No. 2
Trademarks: Of Philadelphia Co. makes an important decision
Penalties
holding that a statute which imposes a penalty
upon
any person, persons or corporation, violating
$20o
of
its provisions in the use of registered trademarks, is contrary to the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the Constitution of the United States, in that it imposes
upon an individual or individuals a penalty for an act
the damage resulting from which may be ascertained, and
which is in no wise a menace to the Commonwealth, or an
infringement of public rights. The decision is a very
satisfactory review of the questions involved and although
not the holding of an appellate court is worthy of reference.
Compare Coffey v. Wilson, 65 Ia. 270.
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CONTEMPT OF COURT.

In Royal Trust Co. v. Washburn, B. & I. R. R. Co., 139
Fed. 865, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals (Seventh Circuit) decides that persons who instituted
Enjoining
Execution
a suit in a State court to enjoin a receiver of a
of Decree
Federal court from enforcing its order directing him to tear up the track of a railroad of which it had
acquired jurisdiction and possession in foreclosure proceedings did not thereby commit an act of contempt
against the Federal court; the State court having a right
to determine whether and to what extent it had jurisdiction and power to grant the relief prayed for, short of
actual physical interference with the possession of a Federal
court. See in connection with this case note to Clapp v.
Otoe County, 45 C. C. A. 591.
CONTRACTS.

In Hudson River Water Power Co. v. Glens Fall Portland Cement Co., 95 N. Y. Supp.,

421,

the New York

Supreme Court (Appellate Division, Third
Department) decides that a contract whereby
an electric company agrees to furnish a cement company
with electrical power for a definite term is assignable by
the cement company.
Assignments

CORPORATIONS.

The Court of Appeals of Kentucky decides in Greene v.
Middleborough Town, Lands Co., 89 S. W. 228, that a
provision of articles of incorporation authorContracts:
Guaranty
izing a corporation to make contracts, acquire,
and transfer property, "possessing the same powers in
such respect as private individuals now enjoy," is limited
by another provision of the articles, defining the business
of the corporation as the purchase and sale of lands, location of town sites, the platting and construction of streets
and alleys, and the construction and maintenance of water
works, lighting plants and street railways, and does not
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authorize the corporation to enter into a contract guarantying the stock of another corporation. See in connection
herewith Mining v. Milling Co. 62 Fed. 356.
The Supreme Court of Washington holds in Childs v.
Blethen, 82 Pac. 405, that a judgment which determines
the amount due to each of the creditors of an
Ation
insolvent corporation, which adjudges that
by Creditors they are entitled to recover the same from the
stockholders, and which fixes the sum due to the creditors,
rendered in receivership proceedings against the corporation, in which a creditor intervenes on behalf of the creditors
and impleads the stockholders as parties defendant for the
purpose of enforcing their statutory liability to the creditors,
is a judgment in favor of the creditors, on which they may
sue though it authorizes the receiver to collect the sum due
from the stockholders.
CRIMINAL LAW.

The Supreme Court of Alabama holds in Smith v. State,
39 S. 329, that in a prosecution for murder, an instruction
that a reasonable doubt is a doubt for which
Reasonable
Doubt
a reason can be given is erroneous. It is
apparently a perilous venture for a trial court to attempt to
define reasonable doubt.
DAMAGES.

The Supreme Court of California decides in Kramer v.
City of Los Angeles, 82 Pac. 334, that where plaintiff maintained a building which he used as a residence,
dancing school, and to rent for parties and
entertainments, and he suffered a loss of engagements
already made for dancing classes and receipts from rentals
of the dancing hall by reason of the flooding of the building
by a break in defendant's storm sewer, a recovery for the
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loss of such receipts was not objectionable as an attempt to
recover lost profits.
DECEDENTS' ESTATES.

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania decides in Johnson's
Estate, 29 Pa. Super. Ct. 255, that the fact that a husband
Murder
has murdered his wife will not prevent him
of Wife
from inheriting her estate under the intestate
laws. Compare Carpenter'sEstate, 170 Pa. 203.
EVIDENCE.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in applying the
statutory rule with respect to the competency of the witness
Competency where the other party to the contract or thing
of Witness in action is dead, holds in Pattison v. Cobb,
Appellant, 212 Pa. 572, that in an action by the executor
of the payee of a judgment promissory note against the
maker, where there is a guaranty of the note indorsed on
the back of it, and the contract of guaranty is solely between
the guarantor and the payee, the guarantor of the note
is a competent witness to prove payment of the note in
the lifetime of the payee, if it appears that the guarantor
had been discharged in bankruptcy after he made the
guaranty and over five years after the obligation of the
maker of the note had matured. The similarity of statutes
in other states makes this decision of general interest.In State v. Powell, 61 AtI. 966, the Court of Oyer and
Terminer of Delaware holds that where, in a prosecution
for homicide the accused admitted the killing,
Homicide:
Threats by
but claimed that she did so in self-defense, and
Deceased
whether accused or deceased was the aggressor
was in doubt, evidence of uncommunicated threats made by
deceased against defendant was admissible as tending to
show that deceased may have been the aggressor. Compare
Wiggins v. People, 93 U. S. 465.
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The Court of Appeals of Kentucky decides in GermanAmerican Securities Co.'s Assignee v. McCulloch et al. 89 S.
Parolr

the bonds issued by a company
that where who
W.
to a 5,bondholder,
executed

his notes for the
payment thereof, were actually the undertaking of the company, and had no value apart from its ability to perform
its agreement, the bondholder, when sued on the note, was
entitled to show by parol that the consideration of the notes
was the undertaking of the company., and that it could not
perform its agreement.
In Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Walker, 75 N. E. 52o, the
Supreme Court of Illinois decides that where a physician
ankle,
Demonstrations testifies as to an injury to plaintiff's
he may use a skeleton for the purpose of explaining the same to the jury. The court says "the skeleton
itself was not offered in evidence but was simply used by the
expert witnesses to illustrate their testimony. The court
might in its discretion have permitted the plaintiff to exhibit
her injured ankle to the jury, and allowed physicians to
explain from it the nature and character of the injury.
It was equally proper to use the skeleton for the purpose of
explaining the testimony." Compare Swift & Co. v. Rutkowski, 182 Ill. 18.
In Lexington St. Ry. v. Strader, 89 S. W. 158, the
Court of Appeals of Kentucky decides that the statement
of the motorman of a car which had collided
with a traveller that the reason he did not
Res Uestae
sound the gong or stop the car was because the gong and
brake were out of repair, made immediately after the
accident and before he had time to manufacture a false
statement with regard to the cause of the accident, was a
part of the res gestae. Compare L. & N. R. R. Co. v.
Foley, 94 Ky. 220.
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FEDERAL COURTS.

The United States Circuit Court (D. South Carolina)
decides in Robert et al. v. Pineland Club et al., i39 Fed.
Jurisdiction: iooi, that where the parties to a suit in a state
Remnoval of court are citizens of different states, and the
Cot
other conditions necessary to make the cause one
of federal cognizance exist, it is removable by the defendant,
although neither party is a citizen or resident of the state
in which suit is brought. Compare Rome Petroleum &c.
Co. v. Hughes Co., 13o Fed. 585.

HOMICIDE.

The Supreme Court of North Carolina in State v.
Horton, 51 S. E. 945, lays down the general rule that
Nature of
where one engaged in an unlawful act is free
Offense

from negligence, and the act is not in itself

dangerous, an unintentional homicide in the commission
of the act is a criminal offence only where the act is malum
in se, and not merely malum prohibitum, and applying this
rule the court holds that a statute prohibiting hunting on
another's land in certain counties without the owner's consent, is malum prohibitum, or wrong because made so by
statute, and not malum in se, or an offence naturally evil
as adjudged by the sense of a civilized community; and so
an unintentional homicide, committed while so hunting, is
not criminal where there was no negligence and that act
was not in itself dangerous. See in connection herewith
State v. Vines, 93 N. C. 493.

INJUNCTIONS.

In Gladish v. Bridgeford, 89 S. W. 77, the Kansas City
Court of Appeals of Missouri holds that where a member
of a voluntary association, organized to promote the welfare of dealers in live stock in a

certain place, was expelled from the association for miscon-
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duct, he was not entitled to an injunction to restrain the
association and its members from refusing to have further
dealings with him, as provided by the association's by-laws,
on the ground that such refusal constituted an illegal boycott. Compare Ertz v. Produce Exchange of Minneapolis, 79 Minn. 140, 48 L. R. A. 91.

JUDGMENT.

The Supreme Court of Illinois holds in City of Chicago
v. McCartney, 75 N. E. 117, that where a petition for conRes
demnation of land to widen a street prayed that
Judicata
the just compensation to be paid for private
property for the improvement should be ascertained by the
jury, .the jury, though authorized to consider benefits to
land not taken, for the purpose of setting off such benefits
against damages, had no power to award a judgment for
benefits in excess of such damages, and hence a judgment
that the land was not damaged was not res judicata of the
question of benefits, precluding an assessment of such land
for benefits accruing from the improvement. One judge
however dissents. Compare Goodwilie v. City of Lake
View, 137 Ill. 51.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.

In Schwoebel v. Fugina, 1O4 N. W. 848, the Supreme
Court of North Dakota decides that if a tenant denies his
Denial of
landlord's title, the latter may at his election
Title
treat it as a disseisin, and the tenancy is thereby
terminated without notice to quit.
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.

The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas holds in Elcan et
al. v. Childress et al. 89 S. W. 84, that the disability of minority cannot be tacked on to the
disability of coverture of the ancestor of the minors.
Tacking
Disabilities
7
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NEGLIGENCE.

The Supreme Court of Michigan holds in Dohn v. City of
Detroit, IO4 N. W. 626, that in an action for injuries to a
Imputed
child by falling through a defective sidewalk
Negligence
while walking with his father, who was holding
the child by the hand, the father's negligence, if any, could
not be imputed to the child. With this case compare Waite
v. Northeastern Railway Co., E. B. & C. 719.
PARENT AND CHILD.

In Morgan v. Reel, 213 Pa. 8i, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania decides that where a grandfather adopts a
Adoption:
grandchild, daughter of a deceased daughter,
Intestacy
and dies intestate, the adopted grandchild
inherits as a child only, and not in a double capacity as
child and grandchild. It is held that the act allowing the
adopted child to inherit as though an actual child is intended
to put the adopted child on the same footing as actual
children if such there should be, but not on any more favorable footing. The case seems to be one of novel impression
and reaches a very satisfactory conclusion.
RAILROADS.

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania decides in Bigham
v. Pittsburgh Construction Company, 29 Pa. Super. Ct. 86,
that where a railroad deposits large quantities
Lands
Outside of
of earth, rock and waste matter, brought from
Right of Way other portions of its right of way, upon land
beyond the line of the slope or embankment contemplated
by the owner's grant to the railroad company, the owner
may maintain an action of trespass, and in this action elect
to treat the injury as permanent in its nature, and to ask
that his entire damages be assessed accordingly. In such a
case in the absence of sufficient and competent evidence
relative to the depreciation in value as a measure of
damages, the jury should be instructed that, subject to their
finding as to the relation of the part occupied by the deposit
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to the rest of the lot, the cost of removing the material
wrongfully deposited on the plaintiff's land, and putting it in
as good condition as if the railroad company's rights as to
the slope had not been exceeded, would be the proper
measure of damages, provided such cost would not be
greater than the value of the land injuriously affected, and
in the latter case the value of such land would be the
measure. See also Duffleld v. Rosenzweig, 144 Pa. 520.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in rendering a
decision under a local statute lays down an important rule in
Howley v. Central Valley R. R. Co., 213 Pa.
Motive Poer 36, which is of general interest. Although the
act under which railroads are incorporated was passed at
a time when electricity was not used as a motive power the
court decides that a railroad company incorporated under
such act is not thereby restricted to the motive power in
use at that time but may use electricity. It is said that in the
absence of a limitation upon the power of a railroad company to use any appliances, or of a prohibition as to the
use of any particular one, it is the duty of the company to
use what, in the light of its observation and experience,
is best and most convenient for it in the operation of its
road, having at all times due regard to the safety of the
public which it was created to serve. In such a case its
duty fixes the measure of its powers in performing it.
What it manifestly ought to do in exercising its franchises it
may do, unless forbidden by its supreme law-the will of its
creator as expressed in the words giving it life. Compare
Potter v. Scranton Traction Co. 176 Pa. 271.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES.

The United States Circuit Court (D. South Carolina)
holds in Lucas v. Milliken, 139 Fed. 816, that a bill for
Diversity of
Citizenship

specific performance of a contract for the sale
to complainant of certain shares of the issued

stock of a corporation, and to recover damages for its

I0
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breach, which does not allege the insolvency of the other
party to the contract, nor that he is about to dispose of the
stock, does not state any cause of action against the
corporation, which is not an indispensable nor a necessary
party. If joined, it is merely a formal party, and its
presence, although a citizen of the same state as complainants, will not defeat the right of the real defendant
to remove the cause, where it is otherwise removable. See
in connection herewith notes to Shipp v. Williams io C. C.
A. 249, and Mason v. Dullagham, 27 C. C. A. 298.
The Supreme Court of Indiana decides in Southern Ry.
Co; v. State, 75 N. E. 272, that a state not being a citizen
.Citizenship: of any state, an action in which a state is
States
the real party in interest cannot be removed
from a state to a federal court solely on the ground of
diverse citizenship. See in connection herewith Upshur
County v. Rich, 135 U. S. 170.
STATES.

The Court of Appeals of New York decides in Sanders
v. Saxton, 75 N. E. 529 that in an action by an owner of
certain land against the commissioner of the land
Action to
Cancel Tax office and the comptroller of the state to have
Deed
certain deeds of land sold for delinquent taxes
declared void, the state is a necessary party, and, as there
is no statute authorizing suit against the state for such
purpose the action cannot be maintained. Compare Louisiana
v. Jumel, 107 U. S. 711.
THEATRES.

In Homey v. Nixon, 213 Pa. 20, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania holds that a theatre ticket is a license revocable at the pleasure of the proprietor of the
Tickets
theatre and upon so revoking it he is responsible only to answer in damages for the broken contract.
The court holds that no action lies against him for refusing
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even without cause to admit an individual into the theatre.
The proprietor of a theatre, it is said, is a private individual,
engaged in a strictly private business, which, though for
the entertainment of the public, is always limited to those
whom he may agree to admit to it. There is no duty, as in
the case of a common carrier, to admit everyone who may
apply and be willing to pay for a ticket, for the theatre
proprietor has acquired no peculiar rights and privileges
from the State, and is, therefore, under no implied obligation to serve the public. When he sells a ticket he creates
contractual relations with the holder of it, and whatever
duties on his part grow out of these relations he is bound to
perform, or respond in damages for the breach of his contract, as it is of that only that complaint can be made.
Of course the decision does not touch the case where the
proprietor excludes some person on the ground of race or
color or other reasons prohibited by statute. Compare
McCrea v. Marsh, 78 Mass. 211.
TORRENS LAW.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota decides it re National
Bond and Security Co., lO4 N. W. 678, that tax liens held
by the State of Minnesota are within the terms
Tax Liens
of an act providing that it shall be joined as a
party defendant in proceedings under the Torrens law whenever it has "an interest in or lien upon" the land in suit.
Compare Webb v. Bidwell, 15 Minn. 479.
TRADING STAMPS.

The effort to combat the use of trading stamps in business appears in a new form in Gamble v. City, Council of
Occupation
Tax

Montgomery, 39 S.

353.

The cases have

apparently agreed that statutes forbidding the
use of trading stamps are unconstitutional. In the case
under consideration the attack seemed to take the form of
unusually high taxation. The Supreme Court of Alabama
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holds however that an ordinance imposing an occupation
tax of $4oo on merchants issuing trading stamps is not
shown to be unreasonable by proof which does not show
how many of the stamps have been redeemed after a buyer
of goodshas preserved the stamps to the amount of $5oo;
it being presumed that the ordinance is reasonable until the
contrary appears on its face or is shown by evidence.
TRUSTS.

In Holbrook's Estate, 213 Pa. 93, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania decides that where a cestui que trust is given
Restraint of the income of a fund "during the term of her
Marriage
natural life or so long as she remains unmarried," with a gift over "in case of her death or marriage," the gift is upon a limitation in favor of the cestui
que trust during the period she remains unmarried, and is
valid. Such a provision is not to be construed as an unlawful condition in restraint of marriage. With this case compare the recent decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts in Harlo v. Bailey, 75 N. E. 259.

WILLS.

In Fralichv. Lyford, 95 N. Y. Supp. 433, the New York
Supreme Court (Appellate Division, Third Department)
Testamentary decides that a pecuniary bequest to an uninTrust
corporated society, to be used by it in such
manner as it may deem most expedient for the development and advancement of Spiritualism in a certain town,
was an absolute gift to the society, and did not create
a trust for the benefit of the object specified, of which
the society was trustee. It is further held that an unincorporated voluntary association, organized for the furtherance of Spiritualism, is incapable of taking a direct bequest,
and therefore the legacy in this case entirely failed. Compare Murray v. Miller, 178 N. Y. 316.

